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ABSTRACT
This thesis was created to research the usability and ease of
understanding of home network hardware, specifically routers. After the
usability is researched, it will highlight the issues and insufficiency with
informational documents from a layman’s understanding and the issues that
arise when home networks are not properly secured. Most technical manuals
that accompany networking hardware are not built for ease of understanding
for someone with little technical knowledge in the field and should prioritize
securing the hardware and user awareness. Additionally, this thesis aims to
bring to light the concerning situation of responsibility post-breach in home
networks, business networks, or data-holding providers. In most cases,
whichever business has the breach should be held liable for compensation to
those affected and initiate better security standards in the future.
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INTRODUCTION

Purpose of Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to inform those without much technical
experience about the dangers of unsecured networks and how to remedy
them.
Objectives of Thesis

The objective for this thesis is to attempt to teach and inform the basics
of home networking, primarily the router. Furthermore, to explain the
potential security risks involved with unsecured networks. It intends to show
that current router manuals are not well formatted for ease of use by the
average person. Its secondary objective is to start the conversation on
wherein lies the responsibility for data breaches on both home, business, and
cloud networks, as well as what has happened in recent personal information
data breaches.
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Organization of Thesis

The first section of the thesis explains why the thesis was created and
explains some of the main points and questions. The second section is the
literature review of various articles and research. The third section will be
explaining the extenuating circumstances created by the Coronavirus
pandemic and how it affected the completion of this thesis. The fourth section
is a brief explanation of the design choices for the website. Lastly, the
responsibility section which will bring forth the conversation on the
responsibility of data breaches.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Securing a home network is not something that is easily done in many
cases. With a staggering 73% of United States adults with home broadband
and 90% that use internet in general in 2019, according to Pew Research
Center, more and more people are getting home networks, which might not
be secure. For many, configuring a router (the main bridge between a
computer and the internet) can be a difficult and frustrating process. Many
people do not necessarily have a lot of technological experience which can
make this even more difficult. On top of all of this, there are people that are
constantly looking for vulnerabilities in a network to take advantage of them.
An article by NetworkWorld states it well, explaining one of the major
problems behind these questions, “gone are the days when operational
technology (OT) was single-handedly responsible for securing IoT, often
taking a “security by obscurity” approach by physically separating production
operations and industrial networks from enterprise networks and the
Internet.” The problem of home network security and the responsibility of the
post compromise situation is what will be concentrated on in this review.

First, to go over some of the many malicious things that can happen to
an unsecured network. From the “Securing Your Home Routers” article from
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Trend Micro, there are many possible ways to infiltrate a home network:
Built-In Backdoors, Vulnerabilities, Web-Based Scripts, and Authentication
Bypass. Built-In Backdoors are usually found in router firmware (software
that is for low-level control for the hardware) from the manufacturer for
faster development and debugging. These, if not properly removed or patched
up, allow hackers to have a free pathway into a home network. Vulnerabilities
in a network can be anything from a piece of malware to security flaws in
management. According to Trend Micro, almost 600 vulnerabilities were
reported by researchers from 1999 to present. There are also Web-Based
Scripts (pieces of code for injecting into a network), which bypass various
authentication for routers, allowing hackers to get into the administrative
side of a network. Finally, there is Authentication Bypass, which is similar to
Web-Based Scripts, but can be done in two ways. The first is locally which is
where an attacker would reside nearby and could guess the administrative
credentials for the router. The other is via the internet and is accomplished by
brute force, in a similar fashion to the local version, and attempts to remote
manage the router.

Once the router has been compromised there are numerous attacks the
hacker can perform. One of the most devastating post compromise threats is a
Botnet. A Botnet is a group, usually very large, of infected devices that are
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internet connected that can be managed by a hacker. These devices are then
often used to carry out Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) occurs when many devices, such as a botnet, floods a
server with requests (example of a request includes opening a website, where
a request to the server for the website is then sent to a computer for viewing).
This is a very prevalent issue, especially with the growing number of Internet
of Things (IoT) devices at 6.381 billion in 2016 and an estimated 20.415
billion by 2020 as mentioned in the article from Gartner. One of the most
prominent botnets is the Mirai botnet. The Mirai botnet was at its peak in
2016. It sent DDoS attacks to groups from security journalist Brian Krebs to
Netflix and other large companies. Before being taken down, the creators of
Mirai botnet released the source code (the code used to create the botnet) to
the public, allowing other hackers to create their own “strains” of the botnet.

Moving on to securing a home network before it becomes
compromised, there are plenty of ways this can be done and make it much
harder for a hacker to get administrative access. One of the simplest and a
very effective countermeasure is to simply change the router password to a
more secure version. This is recommended in most guides to home network
security such as the Trend Micro article and the FTC’s (Federal Trade
Commission) “Securing Your Wireless Network” article. Most routers have
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preset passwords for ease of set up, but not all require changing them after
setting up. A recommended password length should be about 16 characters
including upper and lower case, numbers, and symbols. For an average bruteforce password cracker this can take around 41 trillion years. One of the next
steps is managing the encryption level for the router. There are a few major
types of encryption for wireless; WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), WPA (WiFi Protected Access), and WPA2 (a newer version of WPA). WEP is an
outdated encryption protocol and should not be used but can still be selected
on many routers. WPA is another older encryption protocol and more secure
than WEP but does not use the more advanced encryption algorithm called
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), that WPA2 uses. Further explaining
this in the Lifewire article, “WPA2 is designed to improve the security of Wi-Fi
connections by requiring the use of stronger wireless encryption than WPA
requires. Specifically, WPA2 does not allow the use of an algorithm called
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) that is known to have security holes
and limitations.”

Another tip from the FTC is to log out from the administrative account
so that attackers cannot piggyback off of the open connection and to disable
remote management features which allow outside access (with credentials)
to the device’s controls. I believe that the Trend Micro article sums up this
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issue well, saying “Becoming aware of how home routers can be abused for
cybercriminal activities is one step toward securing these devices.
Manufacturers have begun introducing changes with features like embedded
security, password policies, CAPTCHAs, and users’ access control lists (ACLs),
among others. These features, however, also mean additional costs for home
users and thus become a big challenge for ISPs. As such, we believe that home
routers will still be a prime target of cybercriminals.” Becoming aware of the
problem is one of the largest steps towards prevention when it comes to
cybersecurity.

Another large part of this thesis is the question of responsibility when a
network, personal or enterprise, is compromised and sensitive personal data
is stolen. Questions akin to “Who is at fault if a manufacturer makes the
defaults of a router insecure and a consumer gets attacked?” or “If a company
that you have given sensitive personal data has a security breach, should the
consumer be compensated or forgiven on their credit score?” One of the main
issues regarding manufacturers is the balance between security and cost. This
is summed up well by Kranz from the Network World article, “However,
device vendors have been slow to invest in security because it can add cost,
complexity and time-to-market. With many makers committing clear security
missteps – such as hard-coding default names and passwords into their
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devices – consumer IoT gadgets have been incredibly easy to compromise.”
This is often the core reasoning behind manufacturing security faults and one
of the things that will be independently researched in this thesis.

However, there are some administrative organizations that are
attempting to hold the router and IoT industries to higher security standards.
Organizations such as ODVA (Open DeviceNet Vendors Association), OPC
(Open Platform Communications), ISA (International Society of Automation),
IIC (Industrial Internet Consortium), IEEE Internet of Things Initiative
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), and the IETF (Internet
Engineering Task Force), all exist to hold companies to standards in one way
or another. Another group that has been previously mentioned is the FTC,
which has already held large companies accountable ie: charging ASUSTeK
Computer, Inc. for “critical security flaws” in their routers. Some of these
flaws include “a vulnerability in the AiCloud service to bypass its login screen
and gain complete access to a consumer’s connected storage device without
any credentials, simply by accessing a specific URL from a Web browser.”

That being said, companies and organizations are not the only ones
that are starting to tighten up security standards, especially when it comes to
IoT devices. Multiple laws have been passed or are in the process of being
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passed that limit these insecurities in IoT devices. The California Senate
passed Senate Bill 327 in September 2018, a bill for information privacy for
internet connected devices. The bill states “Manufacturer of a connected
device shall equip the device with a reasonable security feature or features
that are all of the following: appropriate to the nature and function of the
device, appropriate to the information it may collect, contain, or transmit, and
designed to protect the device and any information contained therein from
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” The
United States Congress also passed bill 1691 which exists to “provide minimal
cybersecurity operational standards for Internet-connected devices
purchased by Federal agencies, and for other purposes.” This bill was
introduced into the Senate on the first of August of 2017 and has not made
much progress since, but is an important piece of legislature that could help
protect large groups of individuals and consumers by requiring that these
manufacturers that could be cutting corners in security, use more robust
security standards.
Another bill closer to home is the Oregon legislation bill 646A.622
which moves to the other question of responsibility. This legislation requires
that “A person that owns, maintains or otherwise possesses data that includes
a consumer’s personal information that the person uses in the course of the
person’s business, vocation, occupation or volunteer activities shall develop,
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implement and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect the security,
confidentiality and integrity of the personal information, including safeguards
that protect the personal information when the person disposes of the
personal information.” The question of post compromise responsibility for
data breaches is an interesting topic that does not have nearly enough
awareness for how big of a problem it is or could be. Most likely this is a
situation where people do not worry about a problem until it happens to
them. However, this problem reaches a larger group than many may think, as
stated in the article “A Case of Mistaken Identity? News Accounts of Hacker,
Consumer, and Organizational Responsibility for Compromised Digital
Records” by Erickson and Howard, “In early 2005, a series of high-profile
cases culminating in the loss of more than 140,000 customer credit records
by the data mining firm ChoicePoint helped generate significant public
interest in the dangers associated with digital records of personal
information.” While this is an older statistic and rather low, it is an important
fact in showing how large of a problem identity theft has been and that it is
even larger now. For more recent data, the FTC stated that they received 1.4
million identity fraud reports in 2018. There is a great analogy in regards to
the little that is done to prevent or come up with solutions to data security,
from the article “From data breach to information stewardship” by Mike
Small, “People would not treat money with the same disregard that they treat
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information and data. Taking care to look after property that is not your own
is called stewardship, and what is needed is better information stewardship.”
This kind of information stewardship is needed more than ever as more and
more internet connected devices are put into use and have access to home or
enterprise networks.

With the growing amount of identity theft, what happens to those who
are not at fault when their data is compromised? With so many data breaches
happening it would seem like this is an easier question to answer, but it is
rather gray. An example would be a background check agency that requires
the submission of a person’s social security number. Let us say that agency
then has a compromise for any reason, for this example it will be an insecure
router. From this compromise, all those that have gotten background checks
have now had at least their social security numbers stolen and potentially
much more. Where the gray area comes into play is who should be at fault for
this incident and what should happen to those that have had their identities
stolen? Should the fault lie with the router company that left the security to
low standards and did not require a password change and set a simple default
password for the administrative account? Should it lie with the background
check agency for not making sure that there is better security around the
personal data that they store? Should it be the ISP (Internet Service Provider)

15

that does not have security for what is transferred over their provided
connections? Or should it be the person who submitted the data to the
background check agency, should they have asked and made sure that it
would all be secure? These are all questions that seem to be lacking in
concrete answers but will be explored later in the thesis.

With the potential problems growing more and more each year, this
thesis hopes to add to the conversation of others that have researched this
and bring some of these issues that do not have enough attention to the
foreground. Laws, organizations, or company policies all could help bring
attention to manufacturing issues and “information stewardship.” While more
conversations about where the responsibilities lie when it comes to post
compromise data loss are also needed, until the question of where the
responsibility lies is answered or better defined, people need to continue to
talk about it until there is more precedent either legally or as an industry.
These are huge problems that this thesis hopes to add to the conversation and
bring as much awareness to the issues while also trying to provide some
information to also stop the issue of uninformed consumers with insecure
home networks.
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WHY SECTION

One of the major points of this thesis is to be informative for the
average person so that they can be knowledgeable and make smart decisions
for their own home networks. It would seem like this information would be
readily available online and would not take much effort to find, however that
is not the case. The reasoning behind the existence of this thesis and the
evidence for the difficulty of finding simple information is the topic of this
section.
To find out just what information would show up when having an
average person look up information regarding their own home network
security, different search terms were tested. For each set of search terms the
top three to five results were gone through to see how easily accessible the
information was for someone with little to no technological background.
The first search term was “home network security guide.” The top
result and the Google featured snippet was the Home Network Security Page
from the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) which is
a division of the US Department of Homeland Security. The guide was adept at
describing various potential threats to a home network and solutions to fix
each of the described problems. However, the terminology and explanations
of the solutions would not necessarily be easy to understand without a
17

technological background. Furthermore, while it describes what solutions
could be followed to mitigate the problems illustrated, it does not give any indepth instruction on how to carry out said solutions. This site would be best
used by someone with moderate technological background, as a checklist for
things to accomplish to make sure they have properly secured their network.
The second link was to the Home Wireless Network Security page of the blog
for Heimdal Security, a consumer and enterprise security suite company. The
blog is comprised of both Heimdal employees and guest authors that pitch
article ideas that must be approved by Heimdal. This specific article was
written by Ioana Rijnetu, a guest author who is a Marketing and
Communications Specialist and Cybersecuirty Enthusiast. This article
specifically went through twelve steps to “enhance your home wireless
network security.” This article was much easier to understand from a
layman’s point of view. It went through various steps from as simple as
changing the name of your home network to increasing encryption strength
and changing default IP addresses. Be that as it may, the article did not
provide full step by step instructions for each section. Moreover, many of the
instructions that were given merely linked to other articles and websites such
as WikiHow and Lifewire. The third link was to the Lazy Admin website,
which is a blog operated by Rudy Mens, a System Administrator and ITSpecialist at Thunnissen Groep, a Netherlands real estate company. This blog
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post was less helpful than the Heimdal Security article, but it still did well in
explaining issues in layman’s terminology. Similar to the US Department of
Homeland Security, this blog does not do a great job in adequately explaining
how to solve those problems and where they do, they often lead to other
articles. The fourth and final result for the first search term lead to
Hackernoon, an independent tech media site. The article was written by
David Balaban, an editor at Privacy PC, a security and privacy news site. This
was a rather short and straightforward article that did explain things such as
changing the SSID (Service Set Identifier), encryption, and firewall. While this
article is rather informal, it is not very helpful when it comes to explaining in
easy to understand language. It also does not explain how best to solve the
problems or tips that it covers.
By changing the search term to “home network security for beginners”
it was actually surprising to find out that the top three links were ones that
were already covered in the first search term: the Heimdal Security Blog, Lazy
Admin Blog, and Hackernoon website. Since the first and second search terms
were similar, the third search term was changed to try and find differing
results. The third search term was “how to secure home wifi.” The top result
was for Tech Radar’s article “How to secure your Wi-Fi at home and in your
business” by Paul Rubens. This article starts by talking about increasing
encryption, using a strong password, making sure there are no extra wifi
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access points that are unmanaged, providing a separate network for guests,
hiding network names, using a firewall, enabling MAC authentication, and
using a VPN. All in all, it is a pretty decent guide but it is not very helpful for a
beginner. The second link for this search term was for the Heimdal Security
Blog again, showing there is not variation in search results that are shown on
the front page of Google for this topic. The third and final link was to a blog
for CompariTech. The article by Stephen Cooper was very similar to other
articles however, there were a couple non-traditional tips such as just turning
off the router, using aluminum radar dishes to make the wifi more directed,
or filling your house with aluminum in the ways to build a home faraday cage.
These are more complicated and what most would consider unnecessary tips
that might overly worry or complicate things further for someone who is not
technically adept.

Focusing on a more specific reason why this thesis is important would
be the lack of easily readable manuals for what many people have as their
extent of a home network, the home router. Five router manuals were
examined of varying costs, technicality, and seemingly commonness. The first
router manual that was researched was for the NETGEAR Nighthawk AC1900.
This is a higher-end model router priced at $145 on Amazon as of November
2019. The manual goes through various security features such as allowing
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and blocking access via IP address on page 59, blocking various programs and
services from your network on page 61, and setting up email notifications for
security alerts on page 64. However, it is not until page 125 that they begin to
explain “Basic WiFi settings.” Furthermore, how to change the WiFi password
and encryption level is even farther into the manual at page 127. Perhaps the
most surprising is that how to change the router administrator password is
not explained until page 147. The commonality between all this information
is that many people might become frustrated reading the manual, especially
to page 147, and some might not even read the manual at all.
The next router manual that was analyzed was the Cisco DPC3939,
which is the primary router that Comcast uses for their internet packages and
provided routers. This manual was much shorter than the last being about 57
pages. Most of the critical security information is around page 26-32, again
well into the manual. This manual did a good job explaining the user
interface, but also used a lot of technical language at times such as ASCII,
Hexadecimal, and MAC addresses but does not go about explaining what
those are.
The manual for TP-Link AC1750, which was rated as Amazon's bestselling router as of November 11th, 2019, was the third manual reviewed.
This manual did an excellent job segmenting the manual with a well-designed
table of contents and an interactive PDF which allows you to jump between
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sections with a click. Moreover, the manual does not use technically
complicated terminology and shows frequent pictures of the router’s GUI
(Graphical User Interface) which is extremely helpful for explaining how to
accomplish certain settings. It also explains how to set up limited guest
networks which can help with keeping a home network secure. However, it
does not explain much when it comes to encryption settings and simply
mentioned WPA and WPA2 without explaining what they are, their meaning,
or which is better or more secure. Similar to other manuals changing the login
password is not found until almost the end on page 90 of 98. Additionally,
network security is not found until over halfway through the manual at page
53. It does explain how to setup the firewall and Denial of Service (DoS)
protection settings, access protection, and IP and MAC address binding, which
is beneficial.
The inconsistency and complicatedness of these manuals show one of
the largest problems with home networking equipment. These manuals can
be so convoluted that it could cause frustration and impatience. This
frustration can then turn into overlooking and ignorance to properly setting
up and securing their home networking devices. Thus creates the problem of
easily accessible networks for bad actors to take advantage of and potentially
obtain personal information of those owning the network.
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WEB DESIGN

It seemed that creating a website to be able to alternately host the
thesis or home security guide would be a good idea. Creating the website was
rather simple since its main purpose was to be an information repository.
Due to the simple nature of the website, a Wordpress designed site seemed an
efficient choice. Designs were sketched up on paper to get an idea for what
the site would roughly look like. For a homepage, the Wordpress Morden
page layout was utilized. Four pages total were designed: a homepage, thesis
page, download page, and a short about page.
The homepage contains a small section stating the purpose of the
thesis, a synopsis of the abstract, and a short about the author section as well
as links to the other pages of the site. The thesis page will contain the written
entirety of the thesis with occasional pictures to break up blocks of text and
keep it fresh. The download page will have links to the WOU (Western Oregon
University) thesis page for download of the entire thesis including the home
security guide, and a link to just the home security guide for those who wish
to only have the home security guide for reference. Finally, the About page
contains a short introduction by the author for people to know where the
information is originating from.
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COVID-19 EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES

With the start of the global COVID-19 pandemic, there were
circumstances that caused this thesis to become harder to complete. Due to
quarantine and its mental health impact, there was one section that was not
able to be completed and one that was not fully implemented. The section
that was not complete is the Home Guide for securing home networks. It was
planned to be an easier to read explanation of general settings and how-to for
a generalized router with links or suggestions on how to search for anything
not covered in the guide. The second section affected was the website. The
basic design and layout of the website was complete, spare some content
from the thesis. While partially done, it does not feel right to submit not fully
complete or refined work.
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RESPONSIBILITY

When a data breach does eventually occur, it can be quite shocking and
difficult to figure out just who is at fault and where responsibility lies. This
section attempts to shed some light in that area, but by no means should be
taken as absolute fact for every case, as laws and regulations can vary by
country, state to state, or individual case. According to Thomson Reuters Law
there is “no current central federal mandate that covers data breaches
affecting personal information.” Thus, many cases and outcomes are quite
different as any laws regarding data breaches are primarily state based and
regulated.
One of the first steps to understanding these laws is looking at the
terminology regarding data and their subsequent breaches. The end user or
customer is the individual or organization whose data is being stored. The
data owner is the business that asks for the end user’s data for any of a
multitude of reasons. Finally, the data holder is the business that is storing
the end user’s data. Examples of data owners would be PayPal, Amazon,
Google, or Walmart. Meanwhile examples of a data holder would be AWS
(Amazon Web Services), or other cloud-based data companies. It is not
infrequent or impossible for the data owner and the data holder to be the
same company, as many have their own servers to store the information
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without needing a third-party to store it. Now that the terminology has been
defined, what are some examples of data breaches that people might know,
and what was the result of these breaches?
The first example is the retail company Target which was hacked back
in November 2013. Access to Target’s network was exploited by using the
network credentials of a third-party HVAC provider, Fazio Mechanical
Services, used by Target. Through Target’s network, the exploiters were able
to access Target’s payment system network and gain access to Target
shopper’s personal information. The question being: why did the HVAC
providers have remote access with high privileges on the Target main
network? It was later discovered that the connection to the Target network
was “exclusively for electronic billing, contract submission and project
management.” The problem then changes to why the HVAC company was
connected to the main Target network and why was their so little security to
prevent the breach.
The next example is a well-known data breach: Equifax. The Equifax
data breach affected 143 million Americans. In this case Equifax was both the
data-owner and the data holder. Equifax announced their breach in
September of 2017, although the breach had occurred four months earlier in
mid-May of 2017. The vulnerability was through their use of the Apache
Struts web-application software. However, the vulnerability was found by the
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Apache company and they created a patch in March of 2017. The breach
occurred due to the negligence of applying the patch to the Equifax servers. It
is estimated that the hackers had access to the system for roughly 134 days. It
is unknown if the user’s personal data was encrypted at all, but if it were,
there would have been plenty of time to decrypt the data in that timespan.
Due to this, full names, social security numbers, addresses, dates of birth, and
driver license numbers were stolen or compromised. This is an example of an
extremely avoidable data breach that caused one of the most well-known and
damaging data-breaches in recent history.
Another example is the Israeli cybersecurity company Imperva.
According to their official statement from their Chief Technology Officer
(CTO), Kunal Anand, there was “unauthorized use of an administrative API
key in one of our production AWS accounts in October 2018, which led to an
exposure of a database snapshot.” In this scenario, the company’s data was
accessed through their data-holder, however the security flaw was not in the
data-holder, but in the security control of the data owner. Imperva created an
AWS database snapshot for testing “an internal compute instance that we
created was accessible from the outside world,” which happened to have the
AWS API key to the created snapshot test database. The internal instance was
“compromised,” and the API key was stolen, thus the API key was used to
access the snapshot for testing. At first glance this seems to be a no-harm
27

done scenario, it was a test database that was compromised, so there should
not be any issue. However, Imperva was using actual data from the live
databases for testing, rather than fake test data.
A fourth and more recent breach was of bank holding company Capital
One in July of 2019. Capital One was hacked by Paige Thompson, previously
employed by Amazon AWS, a data holder company. According to Capital One,
roughly one-hundred million people in the United States and roughly six
million people in Canada were affected by this breach. Krebs on Security, a
blog by security journalist Brain Krebs, further researched the breach. It was
discovered that the hack took advantage of a misconfigured Web Application
Firewall. The firewall was assigned too many permissions, including access to
list all the files associated with the web application and read said files. Paige
Thompson was later caught by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
charged with wire fraud and computer fraud and faces up to 25 years in
prison.
So, what came of these data breaches? Target had their CEO and CIO
resign a year later in 2014 and settled for $18.5 million United States Dollars
(USD), split between the affected users of 47 different US states. Meanwhile,
in the Equifax case, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Richard Smith, was
given a compensation package with nearly $20 million USD in bonuses, before
his resignation in September of 2017. In the case of Equifax, the company
28

agreed to a settlement of $575 million USD, however not exceeding $700
million USD. This entitled the nearly 150 million Americans affected to
receive a total of $125 for nearly all their personal information being stolen in
their breach. After Imperva’s breach the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) made
an official statement and update about the breach. The CTO, Kunal Anand, is
still the CTO. The CEO however, submitted their resignation eleven days after
the security incident. In the case of Capital One, Paige Thompson was
captured by the FBI and faces two charges and a lengthy prison term. She was
held solely responsible and there was no compensation to those affected and
no one held accountable in the company so far.
With so few and often complex regulations and laws, it begs the
conversation that this thesis tries to cultivate. In the case of Equifax, who was
it that made the decision or lack thereof, to not update to the most recent
web-server patch? Should the CEO be the one to have resigned, should it have
been the web developer, or should it be the responsibility of the entire
company while understanding that mistakes could happen. In the case that
there is a breach, should $125 be all that is owed to someone who has
potentially lost their identity, credit score, tax returns, money, and more?
Should the government, business, or consumer be held liable for the results of
a data breach? What about the internet service provider that provides
internet access for the hackers that exploit these businesses? The dates of
29

each attack show that this is a constant problem that has not gone away over
the years even as technology has improved since 2013. With the problem still
being relevant it is imperative that more defined and clear laws and
regulations be put in place.
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CONCLUSION

The average user manual for home networking equipment is often too
complex or not optimally organized for a layman to easily secure their home
network. This could be alleviated by creating a simple guide in the front of the
manual for easy access and readability. This thesis attempted to create a
website and generalized home guide for that exact scenario. Many of the
issues that are found in the informational documents that come with home
networking equipment could be potentially solved with rather simple
solutions. The issue of default passwords on routers could be solved with a
myriad of solutions ranging from as simple as a sticker over the power
button, telling them to change the password, to a much more sophisticated
solution of not letting them have access to the internet until the password is
non-default. The organization of manuals could instead focus on basic setup
then immediately proceed into security to protect the consumer. Just some of
these changes could make a difference on the security of the average person’s
home network.
Furthermore, this thesis sought to bring light to the conversation of
where responsibility should lie when a network home or otherwise is
breached and personal information of the users is compromised. Current
laws and regulations are too obscure or not standardized. Because of this
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many people end up uncompensated or under compensated when sensitive
personal information such as social security numbers get stolen. This issue
could be further expanded if the company is a creator of home networking
equipment such as ASUSTeK. The opinion of this thesis is that the business or
data-owner should be held liable in most cases of a personal information data
breach. When a data breach occurs, the consumers or customers should be
notified as soon as possible and without interfering with the investigation.
Once notified the data-owner should put forth a program to improve their
security of personal data in the future as well as explain the fix of the
vulnerability in a reasonable manner. Once this has been done the dataowner should properly compensate the consumer based on data leaked, scale
of breach, and other factors if necessary.
These two points can become a combined problem when looking at
examples like recent Google Nest hacks and other IoT device hacks. These
breaches most likely are caused by a combination of unsecured networks due
to frustrating manuals and lack of proper setup for the devices combined with
potential vulnerabilities from the developers or manufacturers that will go
without compensation. These are problems that still happen every day and
will continue to happen until action is taken to fix issues like default admin
passwords and convoluted manuals or regulations and clear and concise laws
relating to post-breach actions are enacted.
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